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Asian-origin avian influenza (AI) viruses are spread in
part by migratory birds. In Alaska, diverse avian hosts from
Asia and the Americas overlap in a region of intercontinen-
tal avifaunal mixing. This region is hypothesized to be a
zone of Asia-to-America virus transfer because birds there
can mingle in waters contaminated by wild-bird–origin AI
viruses. Our 7 years of AI virus surveillance among water-
fowl and shorebirds in this region (1998–2004; 8,254 sam-
ples) showed remarkably low infection rates (0.06%). Our
findings suggest an Arctic effect on viral ecology, caused
perhaps by low ecosystem productivity and low host densi-
ties relative to available water. Combined with a synthesis
of avian diversity and abundance, intercontinental host
movements, and genetic analyses, our results suggest that
the risk and probably the frequency of intercontinental virus
transfer in this region are relatively low.
I
n Alaska, diverse avian hosts from Asia and the
Americas overlap in a region of intercontinental avifau-
nal mixing hypothesized to be an important zone of Asia-
to-America virus transfer. Aquatic birds, especially
waterfowl and shorebirds, provide a source of influenza
viruses for transmission to mammals and poultry (1–3).
Even without disease, when infected these avian hosts tend
to shed high concentrations of virus in their feces (4–6).
Cross-host infections in wild birds probably occur most
frequently when other birds of the same or different
species feed, drink, or bathe in waters contaminated by the
feces of infected birds. On rare occasions, some of these
avian influenza (AI) viruses, generally of low pathogenic-
ity, have crossed species barriers from wild birds to poul-
try, in which mutations can produce highly pathogenic
strains. From poultry, low and high pathogenicity viruses
(or genomic segments of these viruses) can be introduced
to humans, causing some fatal infections (7). This wild-
bird reservoir can thus provide the genes for the next pan-
demic in humans or epizootic in domestic animals and
presents an ongoing risk.
The rapid spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza
A (H5N1) viruses from Asia across Eurasia (8,9) demon-
strated how avian vectors can be involved in the distribu-
tion of avian and mammalian infections. Key activities for
successful global influenza mitigation measures are sur-
veillance, risk assessment, and epidemiologic modeling
and prediction of AI virus infection in wild birds (10,11).
Anthropogenic factors will also affect the evolution and
distribution of avian influenza viruses. However, we
focused on the natural virus transport system that migrato-
ry birds represent in an important high-latitude region with
low levels of human presence. 
We obtained our baseline data on viruses and vectors
by screening wild birds for AI virus in western Alaska,
starting in 1998. We focused on western Alaska because of
the unparalleled overlap of Old World and New World bird
migration systems in this region. To estimate the risk of
Asian-origin AI viruses being delivered by migratory birds
to North America through Alaska, we evaluated AI virus
infection rates, bird movements, and the diversity and
degree of intercontinental host overlap. 
During the boreal summer, birds come to Alaska to
breed from 6 continents: North and South America, Asia,
Africa, Australia, and Antarctica. Alaska, thus, has direct,
real-time connections with AI virus vectors from much of
the world. It is a critical Old World–New World crossover
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transfer. Eurasian birds are common in Alaska during sum-
mer. Within 2 of the most important vector groups, water-
fowl and shorebirds, at least 43 species regularly found in
this region winter primarily in the eastern or southeastern
parts of Asia; most are aquatic (online Appendix Table,
available from www.cdc.gov/EID/content13/4/547-
appT.htm). Additionally, many species are shared with
Asia across the Bering Sea (online Appendix Table). This
extensive crossover of migratory Old World and New
World birds offers excellent potential for virus exchange
and transfer to the New World. Outbreaks of avian influen-
za that have killed persons in southeastern Asia (7) and
occurrences of highly pathogenic AI (H5N1) infection in
migratory birds (8,9) highlight the global importance of
the Alaska migration system for intercontinental virus
transport.
In Alaska, 5 major factors are involved in the natural
intercontinental movement of avian-origin viruses: 1)
Asian species coming to Alaska; 2) North American
migrant birds (Asian-origin migrants that return to North
America in autumn) breeding in Asia; 3) individual birds
of species that winter on both sides of the Pacific moving
between the continents; 4) species that have limited move-
ments or are resident in the region; and 5) water (it has
been inferred that live AI virus remains viable in fresh
water at high latitudes through the cold northern winters)
(12). 
When we began our study, the role of migratory birds
in the transport of highly pathogenic AI was uncertain, but
wild birds have been found with these viruses, and with
infection several species appear susceptible to severe dis-
ease and death (9,13). In previously reported cases of
infection of wild birds with the highly pathogenic virus,
transmission was thought to be from infected chickens, the
species in which the shift to increased pathogenicity had
originally occurred. Experimental and field studies
(9,14,15) have identified highly pathogenic AI (H5N1)
infection in ducks without clinical disease, which impli-
cates healthy wild birds in transmission. Although in this
regard the Asian AI (H5N1) subtype appears unique
among highly pathogenic AI viruses, wild birds may be
considered as potentially important vectors for strains of
low and high pathogenicity.
Methods
Surveillance, Isolation, and Sequencing
We sampled ducks and shorebirds, 2 groups of aquat-
ic birds important as subsistence foods in rural Alaska,
widely associated with Alaska waters and common among
those species that winter in southeastern Asia (online
Appendix Table). We sampled migratory birds that come
to North America from southeastern Asian wintering
grounds or Asian breeding grounds, as well as North
American birds, which mingle with Old World birds on
shared breeding and fall staging grounds. Intensive and
extensive taxonomic sampling enabled us to obtain the
best possible vectorwide prevalence estimates at our sam-
pling sites. Our animal sampling was done according to
protocols approved by the Institutional Animal Care and
Use Committee.
From May through October, 1998–2004, totals of
7,751 cloacal swabs and 503 fecal samples were collected
from waterfowl (Anatidae) and shorebirds (Charadriidae
and Scolopacidae), primarily at sites on the Yukon-
Kuskokwim Delta, Alaska Peninsula, Seward Peninsula,
the North Slope, and the Aleutian Islands.  Most samples
were obtained after the breeding season (Figure; online
Appendix Table). Each of these areas is internationally
renowned for its avian diversity and abundance during the
migration periods and the boreal summer. 
Swabs and fresh fecal samples were placed in sterile
medium (brain–heart infusion buffer with 10,000 U/mL
penicillin G, 1 mg/mL gentamicin, 20 µg/mL ampho-
tericin B) in the field and cooled before transport to the
University of Alaska Museum laboratory. Transportation
times were generally short (≈2–14 days), during which
time samples were kept cool (mechanically refrigerated or
buried above permafrost), frozen at –20°C, or kept on liq-
uid nitrogen. Upon arrival at the laboratory, they were
placed in a –70°C freezer. They were then shipped
overnight to the Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory in
Athens, Georgia, USA, in thick coolers with –70°C ice
packs. Samples were not exposed to freeze-thaw cycles
but were thawed for analysis. 
Samples were processed for virus isolation
(1998–2000) or screened by real-time reverse transcrip-
tase–PCR (rRT-PCR) for influenza A virus (2001–2004),
and all rRT-PCR–positive samples were subjected to virus
isolation. Virus isolation was performed in embryonating
chickens eggs as per standard procedures (16). For rRT-
PCR, RNA was extracted from cloacal swab material with
Trizol LS reagent (Invitrogen, Inc., Carlsbad, CA, USA) in
accordance with manufacturer’s instructions. RNA was
tested for avian influenza virus matrix (M) gene, which
detects all type A influenza viruses (17). The recovery rate
was no better when virus isolation was used (of the 5 iso-
lates, 3 were from rRT-PCR and 2 were from direct virus
isolation). Several thousand samples have been processed
by rRT-PCR at the Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory
with an internal positive control; the recovery rate between
the methods is equivalent, which indicates that inhibition
was not a major factor in our study.
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Delimitation of the Alaska portion of the overlap zone
between Old World and New World migration systems in
this region was done by using published and unpublished
data on Alaska birds from the University of Alaska
Museum. Abundance estimates were taken from the litera-
ture (18–23) and unpublished data (D.D.G., K.W., and
University of Alaska Museum). Maps were created and
species richness values were calculated by using ArcView
3.3 and ArcGIS 9.1 (Environmental Systems Research
Institute, Inc., Redlands, CA, USA).
Genetic Analyses
We used complementary population genetic approach-
es to assess approximate levels of individual intercontinen-
tal movement for 2 vector species of ducks: green-winged
teal (Anas crecca) and mallards (Anas platyrhynchos).
Gene flow between green-winged teal populations in east-
ern Asia (n = 14) and Alaska (n = 40) was determined by
using amplified fragment-length polymorphisms (AFLPs).
Whole genomic DNA was extracted from tissues by using
the DNeasy Tissue Kit (QIAGEN, Valencia, CA, USA).
AFLP data were generated by using the Applied
Biosystems AFLP Plant Mapping Kit (Foster City, CA,
USA) and protocol as described (24). Two fluorescently
labeled primer pairs were run on an ABI PRISM 3100
Genetic Analyzer (Applied Biosystems). Electrophero-
grams were scored manually and 218 loci were identified.
STRUCTURE 2.1 (25) was used to indirectly estimate
gene flow by using prior geographic information about
each population and determining whether individuals were
assigned genetically to their population of origin.
Misassigned individuals are likely to have been immi-
grants or to have had recent immigrant ancestors (25).
Because AFLPs provide dominant data, each locus is treat-
ed as a haploid allele; the no-admixture model with corre-
lated allele frequencies was used. Multiple independent
simulations were run at different lengths. Results are based
on 100,000 burn-ins and 200,000 subsequent iterations.
Pairwise FST estimates (AFLP-SURV 1.0, [26]) gave com-
parable results (not shown). To estimate gene flow
between mallards in Alaska (n = 39) and eastern Asia (n =
105), we used Migrate software (27) to estimate the neu-
tral parameter theta (4Neµ) and the migration rates
between continents (4Nem) based on sequence data of 256
bp from intron 6 of ornithine decarboxylase (28). Multiple
factors (e.g., mutation rates, effective vs. census popula-
tion sizes, and percentage of immigrants successfully
breeding) made it difficult to convert estimates based on
population genetics to absolute numbers of immigrant
individuals. Consequently, we chose a range of values
commensurate with the moderate levels of gene flow
found (online Appendix Table).
Estimating Asia-to-America Influenza Influxes
To estimate a baseline delivery rate of Asian-origin AI
viruses to Alaska through these overlapping migration sys-
tems, we considered movement rates (M) of individuals
from Asia (i) to Alaska (j) in conjunction with infection
rates (I) and the incidence of specific influenza virus
strains (Vx) that we detected in this study. Measuring the
risk associated with this threat thus becomes Mij × I =
Asian-origin infected bird arrival; strain-specific incidence
(Vx) can be added to assess the narrower risk for subtypes,
e.g., H5.
Results
Within Alaska, the complexities of bird migration
shape the taxonomic and geographic space where Asian-
origin AI viruses are most likely to appear. Using Asian
species as a guide, we coupled their distributions with
those of American migrants (which are necessary to effec-
tively transfer Asian AI virus to the greater New World) to
define the extensive overlap of intercontinental avifaunas
in northwestern North America (Figure) as the Beringian
Crucible. Because of the mingling of intercontinental avi-
faunas, this area is most likely to harbor host switching and
genetic reassortment among AI viruses from Asia and the
Americas.
Our surveillance of wild-bird AI virus focused on the
eastern, or North American, part of the Beringian Crucible
(Figure). We found low rates of infection among the 8,254
samples obtained from the most important host groups,
waterfowl (Anatidae) and shorebirds (Charadriidae and
Scolopacidae; online Appendix Table). From these sam-
ples we obtained only 5 isolates, which represent an infec-
tion rate of just 0.061%. These isolates included
hemagglutinin subtypes H3, H4, and H6 (29). The 5 iso-
lates were found in 3 (0.2%) of 1,477 green-winged teal
(Anas crecca), 1 (0.76%) of 131 mallards (Anas platyrhyn-
chos), and 1 (0.03%) of 3,703 northern pintails (Anas
acuta). We found neither evidence of a clearly Eurasian
origin for any of the virus genes sequenced from these
Alaska isolates (29) nor H5 subtypes. Our data do show a
remarkably close genetic association between avian
influenza (H6) virus in Alaska ducks and a poultry out-
break in California in nucleoprotein and nonstructural pro-
tein A genes (29). This finding reflects real-time
connections of migratory ducks between Alaska and
California, and this vector connection extends into the
Russian Far East (30). These findings affirm the intracon-
tinental importance and risk posed by this region.
The number of individuals of the most important host
groups (waterfowl and shorebirds) that come to Alaska
from Asia is an important and heretofore unknown variable
that affects the level of risk posed by these birds. Asian
species are easiest to enumerate, because species-level
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species occur on both sides of the North Pacific and move
regularly between Asia and North America (online
Appendix Table) and thus represent another important
group of species for risk assessment. Within-species inter-
continental movements of taxa that are distributed across
both Asia and North America are challenging to quantify.
Most species-level information is inadequate, and methods
such as bird banding have not provided numeric estimates
of these movements. We have summarized available data
and used population genetics in 2 key vector species to
estimate degrees of intercontinental avifaunal interchange
in this region (online Appendix Table; an expanded version
is available from the authors). Our population genetic
work used 2 complementary methods and focused on 2
duck species carrying AI viruses in this region. For green-
winged teal, assignment tests using AFLP markers showed
that ≈2 (5%) of 40 individuals from Alaska appeared to be
recent immigrants from Asia. In mallards, migration-rate
values (4Nem, the number of immigrants in relation to
effective population size) for individuals coming from
Asia to Alaska were 1,064−1,727 (95% confidence inter-
val) effective immigrants per generation. In each of these
host species, intercontinental gene flow thus appears to be
moderate (neither very low nor high), which indicates that
thousands of individuals of these species may be coming to
Alaska from Asia each year (online Appendix Table).
These results corroborate the limited observational evi-
dence from which we understood these movements to be
well above zero but not high.
We estimate that 1.5–2.3 million birds from the fami-
lies Anatidae, Charadriidae, and Scolopacidae come to
Alaska from Asia each year (online Appendix Table).
Multiplying this vector flow by the 0.061% AI infection
rate that we measured among these families in Alaska sug-
gests that 901–1,389 Asian-origin viruses may come from
this source. However, our measure of infection rates is
based on ducks in autumn, a taxonomic group and time
known for increased infection rates (31,32). Although a
few of our autumn duck samples are probably from birds
coming from Asian breeding grounds, we have no isolates
from Scolopacidae, perhaps due to fewer samples.
Scolopacidae is the numerically dominant host group and
is more likely to bring Asian-origin viruses in spring
(online Appendix Table, [32]). Thus, our estimates of virus
coming to Alaska from Asia can be considered to be high.
Asian-origin AI virus arrival would most likely occur in
the Beringian Crucible (Figure), which in western Alaska
is 256,400 km2, about the size of the United Kingdom or
the US states of Wyoming or Oregon. Insofar as we have
not detected H5 or H7 subtypes among our 8,254 samples,
their incidence has been too low to effectively measure.
Given the statistical power of our sample, their delivery
rate from Asia through this system appears to be very low.
Discussion 
Our surveillance did not show a “hotspot” of AI virus
infection among avian hosts. Much higher infection rates
are known from other multiyear surveillance studies at
lower latitudes, e.g., Delaware Bay (≈4.7%, [32]), south-
ern Minnesota (10.8%, [5]), and Alberta (22.2%, [32]) and
British Columbia in Canada (55%, although only a single-
year study, [33]). The infection rates we found are substan-
tially lower than those found for interior Alaska (9%, [12]).
Arctic conditions in Alaska prevail well south of the Arctic
Circle in the treeless regions of western Alaska, and the US
Arctic includes the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian
Archipelago (34), a tundra ecosystem where our sampling
was concentrated (Figure). Aerial surveys of waterfowl
across Alaska show more ponds and fewer ducks per unit
area on tundra; the number of ducks per pond on tundra
habitat (2.1) is less than half the number found in the bore-
al-forest dominated interior (5.5, [18]). This simple eco-
logic factor (perhaps due to the lower productivity of these
tundra ecosystems), resulting in the dilution of virus in
waters with fewer available hosts, may in part explain our
results. This is the first geographically and taxonomically
extensive Arctic AI surveillance in North America, and it
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Figure. Composite geographic informa-
tion system map illustrating the overlap of
New World and Old World migration sys-
tems among 64 species of waterfowl
(family Anatidae) and shorebirds (families
Charadriidae and Scolopacidae) in north-
ern and western Alaska (darkness of
shade indicates species richness). This
overlap between Asiatic and American
birds in these families occurs in a zone
whose extent is equivalent to a geograph-
ic band running from Lake Superior to
North Dakota then to Texas and California
in the lower 48 US states (left inset).suggests that some Arctic effect lowers infection rates,
thus lowering the risk of intercontinental viral transfer in
these high-latitude regions. Our infection rates are low,
comparable to those occurring at much lower latitudes
(e.g., 9,35), whereas mid-latitude rates can be 2–3 orders
of magnitude higher (33).
Human population densities in Alaska are relatively
low, especially in the Beringian Crucible, and Alaska lacks
a large agricultural sector. However, mammalian carni-
vores abound and could be susceptible hosts (36). Direct
human infection from wild birds is possible, but transmis-
sion from birds to humans is difficult (37,38).
Nevertheless, exposure in this region may be considerable;
hunters kill ≈99,000 waterbirds for food each year on the
Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta alone (39).
Although the existence of North American and
Eurasian viral lineages is well established in the literature,
evidence from other regions of North America has shown
that geographic structure has been insufficient to prevent
sporadic intercontinental exchange of some hemagglutinin
subtypes (29,40). Our results can be considered to confirm
the comparative rarity of such events in this important
region of Alaska. Despite high diversity of host species
and high numbers of individual birds in Alaska making
intercontinental movements, the low AI infection rates and
the genetic attributes of virus isolates (29) suggest that at
most only small numbers of Asian-origin AI viruses or
genes likely arrive in Alaska annually. Although AI virus-
es from Alaska have a clear link with other viruses in the
lower 48 US states (29), the predominance of Arctic eco-
logic conditions and the lack of agriculture in the Alaska
region most affected suggest a low risk for intercontinen-
tal viral transfer in this region.
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